Rocking the Sochi Olympics Narrative: Boris Nemtsov and Putin’s Sovereignty by Makarychev, Andrey
 ROCKING  THE  SOCHI  OLYMPICS  NARRATIVE:  
BORIS  NEMTSOV  AND  PUTIN'S  SOVEREIGNTY 
 
 
Andrey Makarychev, University of Tartu 
Alexandra Yatsyk, Institute of Human Sciences, Vienna 
 
Abstract 
The authors analyze Nemtsov’s contribution to the Olympic debate from the viewpoint of 
his public activism, as well as in terms of some concepts embedded in different political theories. 
Although Nemtsov himself was a policy practitioner, this chapter seeks to inscribe the discourse 
originated from his public campaigning into academic conceptualizations that might shed light on 
his legacy from a wider perspective of post-Soviet transformations in Russia. More specifically, 
the authors deploy Nemtsov’s Olympic narrative in a zone of conflictual interactions of 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses. It appears obvious that, as seen from a political 
perspective, Nemtsov is strongly grounded in the latter, being one of the most outstanding critics 
of the Putin regime. Yet given the blurred boundary between the hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic discourses, the authors argue that one needs a fine-tuned conceptual reference points 
to substantiate the counter-hegemonic dispositions of Nemtsov's narrative. These proposed points 
are two binaries of inclusion and exclusion, and norms and exceptions. More specifically, the 
authors interpret the counter-hegemonic potential of Nemtsov's narrative as rooted in his 
intention to challenge two pillars of Putin's concept of sovereignty - a) the ability to define the 
criteria for inclusion in (and thus exclusion from) Russia as a political community, and b) the rule 
by exceptions, as opposed to the rule by norms.  The two dichotomies can be used for analysis of 
Nemtsov's Olympic discourse. One way would be to look at them through the prism of an 
important linkage between global institutions and authoritarian regimes, duly articulated by 
Nemtsov. Another way of using the abovementioned dichotomies is through discussing the 
uneasy correlation between soft power and hard power, as exemplified by Nemtsov’s take on 
linking the Sochi Olympics and the annexation of Crimea in one explanatory framework of 
analyzing the mechanisms of power under Putin's rule. 
 
Introduction 
The Sochi winter Olympics of 2014 were a momentous element in the ongoing process of 
Russian identity-making, with political narratives often trumping discussions about sports as 
such. In the opinion of foreign observers, “these Olympics are about politics as well as sports”1.                                                         
1 Miriam Lanskoy, Dylan Myles-Primakoff. Sochi’s Bitter Medicine, Foreign Policy, January 31, 2014, 
available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/01/31/sochis-bitter-medicine/ 
Due to its strong political accents the Sochi Games became a linchpin of different practices of 
governance, on the one hand, and policies of contestation and resistance, on the other.  
The voice of Boris Nemtsov, a leader of the anti-Putin movement, who – rather 
symbolically – was born in Sochi, was one of the loudest among skeptics of the Games' official 
celebratory narrative. He contested the rationale of the Sochi Olympic project mainly on grounds 
of corruption charges, mass-scale embezzlement, administrative inefficiency and 
mismanagement. This is where two research questions we are going to address in this paper 
unfold: what political strings he pulled by critically addressing a plethora of financial and 
economic issues, and what academic concepts are needed for understanding the deeply political 
nature of his anti-corruption campaigning.   
For untangling these questions, we intend to analyze Nemtsov’s contribution to the 
Olympic debate not only from the viewpoint of his public activism, but also in terms of some 
concepts embedded in different political theories. Although Nemtsov himself was a policy 
practitioner, this paper seeks to inscribe the discourse originated from his public campaigning 
into academic conceptualizations that might shed light on his legacy as seen from a wider 
perspective of post-Soviet transformations in Russia. More specifically, we deploy Nemtsov’s 
Olympic narrative in a zone of conflictual interactions of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic 
discourses. It appears obvious that, as seen from a political perspective, Nemtsov is strongly 
grounded in the latter, being one of the most outstanding critics of the Putin regime. Yet what 
seems to be consensual and almost evident, might turn into a puzzle deserving a subtler academic 
analysis. Given the blurred boundary between the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses 
(often reminiscent of a "line in the sand"), we argue that we need a fine-tuned conceptual 
reference points to substantiate the counter-hegemonic dispositions of Nemtsov's narrative. We 
find these points in two binaries of inclusion and exclusion, and norms and exceptions. More 
specifically, we interpret the counter-hegemonic potential of Nemtsov's narrative as rooted in his 
intention to challenge two pillars of Putin's concept of sovereignty - a) the ability to define the 
criteria for inclusion in (and thus exclusion from) Russia as a political community, and b) the rule 
by exceptions, as opposed to the rule by norms.  
Then we show how the two dichotomies can be used for analysis of Nemtsov's Olympic 
discourse. One way would be to look at them through the prism of an important linkage between 
global institutions and authoritarian regimes, duly articulated by Nemtsov. Another way of using 
the abovementioned dichotomies is through discussing the uneasy correlation between soft power 
and hard power, as exemplified by Nemtsov’s take on linking the Sochi Olympics and the 
annexation of Crimea in one explanatory framework of analyzing the mechanisms of power 
under Putin's rule. 
Empirically, we base our analysis on two reports co-authored and widely publicized by 
Boris Nemtsov - “Sochi and the Olympics” (co-authored with Vladimir Milov, 2009) and "The 
Winter Olympics in Subtropics" (co-authored with Leonid Martyniuk, 2013). To these two texts 
we add dozens of his interview, available both in written form and video-recorded in the recent 
six years, in which he elaborated on and further promoted his main arguments. We also include in 
our empirical base media and Internet materials reflecting Nemtsov's campaign for the mayor of 
Sochi in 2009, which appears to be an important element in developing his critical attitudes 
towards the Games and in articulating most of the issues that became topical a few years later. 
 
Nemtsov at the Crossroads of Hegemony and Counter-hegemony  
 In this section we argue that Boris Nemtsov's engagement with the Sochi Olympic 
discourse has to be viewed as part of political collisions between hegemonic (i.e. official and 
Kremlin-generated) and counter-hegemonic / oppositional discourses. Unlike those authors who 
reduce the political meanings of the Olympics to its potential for boosting "sports nationalism" 
and demonstrating "national superiority"2, we venture to explain the political logic of the Sochi 
Games from the viewpoint of hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourses clashing with - but 
also imbricating over - each other, and deploy Boris Nemtsov's narrative in this dichotomous 
frame. Of course, his contribution to counter-hegemonic strategies was enormous, but a deeper 
contextualization of his narrative might elucidate and bring up new facets of the interrelationship 
between hegemony and counter-hegemony.  
 There are several ways in which the lines between the two are blurred. First, the anti-
corruption momentum, key for Nemtsov's Olympic scepticism, was to some extent appropriated 
by the Kremlin that does agree that the problem exists and from time to time launches campaigns 
for bringing corrupt public servants to trial. In particular, Putin’s dismissal of Akhmed Bilalov, 
the head of “The Resorts of the Northern Caucasus” company 3 , for mismanagement of 
construction works in Sochi, attests to the possible – though always only partial - absorption of 
anti-corruption discourse by the officialdom.  
 Second, Nemtsov used to present himself as an experienced regional leader (governor in 
Nizhny Novgorod and later a member of the legislature in Yaroslavl’ oblast) and a federal 
politician. It is telling, for example, that the cover of the report “Sochi and the Olympiad” 
presents its co-authors, Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov, as holders of important positions in 
the Russian government in the past - first vice prime minister (1997-1998) and deputy minister of 
energy (2002), correspondingly.  
As former public servants, they had to find a delicate balance between unveiling the 
shadow economy of the exorbitantly costly Olympic show, on the one hand, and supporting the 
idea of the Games in Russia, on the other. Being aware of the dangers of rejecting this idea as 
such, the two co-authors explicitly affirmed: “We, as many Russians, would like Russia to 
                                                        
2  For an example of reductionist approaches, see: Vitaly Gorokhov. Natsional'nye identichnosti v 
global'noi sportivnoi kul'ture: vyzovy Sochi-2014 dlia Olimpiiskoi komandy Rossii, Zhurnal sotsiologii i 
sotsial'noi antropologii, N 5, 2013, pp. 71-86. 
3  Andrey Pertsev. Olimpiada ne povod dlia gordosti, Gazeta.ru, 27 June 2013, available at 
http://www.gazeta.ru/politics/2013/06/26_a_5394569.shtml 
successfully host these Games. We are in favor of the Olympiad” 4. The main alternative to the 
initial scenario of the Olympics they proposed is rather technical – the decentralization of the 
Games, i.e. moving most of competitions away from Sochi to other Russian cities with sports 
infrastructure much better prepared for hosting winter events, including Moscow, St. Petersburg, 
Kazan, Yaroslavl, Cheliabinsk, Khanty-Mansiisk, Ufa, Novosibirsk, Saransk, etc.5  
Third, a paradoxical common ground that Nemstov shared with Putin can be found in the 
concept of hegemonic masculinity. There are lots of recent works analyzing Putin’s regime in 
gender and biopolitical terms6. As Valerie Sperling demonstrates, the same characteristics are 
also inherent for Russian counter-discourses, including activist art protest, as exemplified, for 
instance, by the Pussy Riot group7. Yet in contrast to the latter, homophobic exposures and 
LGBT issues were never high in Nemtsov’s critical agenda. He lambasted corruption, ecological 
degradation and human rights violations from a viewpoint of hegemonic masculinity deeply 
rooted in a patriarchal society. In 2011 he made some sexist and homophobic remarks toward 
Evgenia Chirikova, Nadezhda Tolokonnikova, Leonid Parfenov and other liberals as ‘lesbians, 
bitches and faggots’ 8 . His later pronouncements were more balanced: in particular, in his 
Livejournal post in February 2013 he reacted to the infamous amendment to the anti-gay 
propaganda law by saying that he can’t be silent on this “rascals’ law”9.  
Internationally, the most visible element of the anti-Sochi protests was the LGBT 
campaign against the anti-gay propaganda law. “The Winter Olympic Games … are sure to be a 
site of protests and demonstrations, thanks to myriad issues with human rights, especially 
Russia's controversial anti-LGBT propaganda law”10, a Western journalist asserted on the eve of 
the opening ceremony. Yet Nemtsov’s public exposure of his macho life style (‘I am a hetero, I                                                         
4  Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov. Sochi i Olimpiada. Independent expert report of members of 
“Solidarity” United Democratic Movement, Moscow, 2009, P. 5 available at 
http://www.rusolidarnost.ru/files/Sochi_i_Olimpiada.pdf 
5  Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov. Sochi i Olimpiada. Independent expert report of members of 
“Solidarity” United Democratic Movement, Moscow, 2009, pp. 34-35 available at 
http://www.rusolidarnost.ru/files/Sochi_i_Olimpiada.pdf 
6 See, for instance: Anna Bernstein. An Inadvertent Sacrifice: Body Politics and Sovereign Power in the 
Pussy Riot Affair. Critical Inquiry, 2013, 40 (1), pp. 220–241; Helena Goscilo (ed.) Putin as celebrity and 
cultural icon. New York: Routledge, 2013; Francisco Martinez. The erotic biopower of putinism: from 
glamour to pornography. Laboratorium, 2013, 4 (3), 105–122; Peter Rutland. The Pussy Riot affair: 
gender and national identity in Putin’s Russia. Nationalities Papers, 2014, 42 (4), 575–582; Ellen Rutten. 
'Putin on Panties: Sexing Russia in Late Soviet and Post-Soviet Culture', in Jenny Genis, René Martin, et. 
al (eds.) Between West and East: Festschrift for Wim Honselaar. Amsterdam: Pegasus, 2012, pp. 567–
597. 
7 Valerie Sperling. Sex, Politics and Putin: Political legitimacy in Russia. NY: Oxford University Press, 
2015. 
8 Editorial. Boris Nemtsov: «Lesbiyanka, blyad', LGBT, blyad'». GayRussia portal. December 21, 2011. 
Available at http://www.gayrussia.eu/content/news/russia/3300/  
9  Boris Nemtsov. Eschio odin zakon podletsov. Livejournal blog, February 1, 2013. Available at http://b-
nemtsov.livejournal.com/168420.html  
10 Michelle Garcia. The Long History of Olympic Boycotts, Protests and Demonstrations, January 27, 
2014, available at http://www.advocate.com/sports/2014/01/27/long-history-olympic-boycotts-protests-
and-demonstrations 
love women’ 11 ) prevented him from embracing strong corporeal and bodily rhetoric for 
challenging Putin’s regime. In terms of both the sovereign power and Nemtsov's discourse, 
holding the hegemonic masculine position means insignificancy of such issues as LGBT or 
feminist claims for emancipation. In his revelatory public campaigning against corruption at the 
Sochi Olympics he preferred to distance from the LGBT protest, as well as remained indifferent 
to the international attempts of bringing up another high profile issue - that of Circassian 
genocide12. This demonstrates flexibility of boundaries between the hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic discourses, as well as an inner hierarchy constitutive for each of them.  
 
The Inclusion / Exclusion Game 
This fuzzy line between hegemony and counter-hegemony may serve a starting point for 
claiming that Nemtsov's Olympic counter-strategy was double-tracked. On the surface, it was 
premised on a set of rational and calculable arguments that could have constituted the 
Habermasian space for public communication with the Kremlin, potentially conducive to a shared 
understanding of the common good. In this vein, one of his central points was that the exorbitant 
budget of the Games could be spent with more palpable social effects for each Russian family. 
This discourse was harmonious with multiple media articles critical of the Sochi project for its 
opaqueness and the cult of secrecy13, but in the meantime avoided excessive symbolic association 
with cosmopolitan / liberal emancipatory agenda. Nemtsov invested more efforts in strengthening 
his reputation as experienced domestic practitioner, rather than in supporting or solidarizing with 
the types of protest that transcended the cultural boundaries of hegemonic masculinity. 
Yet under a closer scrutiny one may discover that Nemtsov’s narrative, with its strong 
emphasis on legal and technical matters, was deeply political in at least two aspects. First, it was 
aimed at internationally de-legitimatizing the regime by means of publicly exposing its corrupt 
nature. Second, Nemtsov ultimately questioned the domestic core of Putin’s hegemonic discourse 
as aimed at defining the rules of belonging to the Russian political community-in-the-making 
through emotionally articulating the ideas of patriotism and unconditional – if not quasi-religious 
- loyalty to the state. It is the idea of Russia’s domestic heterogeneity and diversity that might 
explain the search for a “national idea” in 1990s as an instrument for anchoring this community 
in certain nodal points and thus avoiding its further – and very probable, as many Russian 
independent analysts deem – decomposition. Endeavors of defining the rules of belonging – and                                                         
11 Boris Nemtsov. Eschio odin zakon podletsov… 
12 Alexis Zimberg, Christian Caryl. The Russian Anti-Olympic Protest that Putin Doesn’t Want You to 
Know About, Foreign Policy, February 19, 2014, available at http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/19/the-
russian-anti-olympic-protest-that-putin-doesnt-want-you-to-know-about/ 
13 Nikolay Yaremenko. Strashnye kartinki iz Sochi, Chastniy Korrespondent, 10 October 2013, available 
at  
http://www.chaskor.ru/article/strashnye_kartinki_iz_sochi_33788?fb_action_ids=339787069498874&fb_
action_types=og.recommends&fb_source=other_multiline&action_object_map=%7B%223397870694988
74%22%3A210252419152185%7D&action_type_map=%7B%22339787069498874%22%3A%22og.reco
mmends%22%7D&action_ref_map=%5B%5D 
thus the criteria for inclusion in and exclusion from the national community-in-the-making – took 
different forms, including those based on traditional - ethnic and religious – stabilizers of national 
identity. Yet obviously, too strong an emphasis on the dominating Orthodoxy and ethnically 
Russian identity could be divisive and rejected, in particular, by Russian Muslims. With the 
beginning of Putin’s third presidential term, the Kremlin started using different instruments of 
consolidating national majority on conservative and isolationist principles. This policy included 
the legal exceptionalization of LGBT people (the anti-gay propaganda law)14, holders of double 
citizenship (who since autumn 2014 have to register in this capacity in the Federal Migration 
Service) 15  and professionals cooperating with foreign partners (the “foreign agents” 
legislation)16. Public appeals to strip political dissenters of Russian citizenship – reminiscent of 
the widely known Soviet practice – are also part of the policy of “purifying” the collective body 
of the nation by means of marginalizing and ostracizing groups that are believed to misfit the 
hegemonic vision of “Russianness”. The rhetorical labeling of dissenters – including Nemtsov 
himself - as “the fifth column” and “national traitors” served the same purpose of solidifying the 
pro-Putin majority against the artificially constructed “internal enemies”.  
The Putin regime is vitally interested in finding and properly articulating key reference 
points to be capable of not only consolidating the nation, but also of publicly exposing the 
distinction between the loyalty to the “common cause” and disloyalty, fidelity and infidelity, with 
the blackening of the latter. In Etienne Balibar's words, "a collective identity, or the constitution 
of a relation of belonging ... is the constitution of a bond"17. The Sochi Olympics was apparently 
one of those – seemingly non-ideological – mega-projects politically aimed exactly at 
constructing collective identity and allegiance by means of contriving such a bond. By so doing, 
this project emotionally invested in both consolidating the political community and 
differentiating it from the “anti-patriotic” pro-Western opposition, of which Nemtsov was a 
leading figure.  
It is from here that the power of the Kremlin to define criteria of belongingness to the 
political community of Russia stems. Putin’s Sochi project was politically meant to directly 
attach the inclusion into this community to the patriotic support for the Games as an epitome of 
Russian grandeur and worldwide respect, regardless of questionable instruments that were 
employed for this purpose - from enforced evictions to financial wrongdoings. To some extent, 
Putin’s strategy can be understood in the categories of jouissance, a Lacanian psychoanalytical 
concept reinterpreted by Slavoj Zizek as implying normalization through imposed enjoyment and 
consumption of entertainment as an essential, if not central, part of the spirit of national 
                                                        
14 Amendment 6.21 for the Russian Law Book of Administrative Violations, subjects to administrative 
punishment from 2 to 5 years for ‘propaganda of homosexual relations among minors’, is effective of June 
30, 2013 
15 Federal Law of Russian Federation # 142, is effective of June 4, 2014  
16 Federal Law of Russian Federation # 121, is effective of June 29, 2012 
17 Etienne Balibar. Politics and the Other Scene. London and New York: Verso, 2002. P.27 
community that may lose coherence “when there is no belief in a shared enjoyment, whether 
shared in a fantasmic past or an idealized future”18.  
 This explanatory framework can be helpful for comprehending what is politically counter-
hegemonic in Nemtsov’s Sochi narrative that seemingly was just another version of multiple anti-
corruption investigations and invectives19, including those integrated in the hegemonic discourse. 
The kernel of Nemtsov's protestation against the Sochi Olympics was that, speaking about 
corruption in seemingly financial and economic terms, he in fact touched upon the deeply 
political issue of emotionally constructing the collective Russian Self on the basis of the loyalty 
to the regime. He contested the key element of Putin’s Olympic discourse – the pride on the state, 
and substituted it with its opposite – the shame for the corrupt ruling class. This contestation 
exacerbated a deep feeling within the society of a “split into fans of the Olympics and haters of 
the Olympics… Even close friends fight over it: ‘Oh, you like the Olympics — that means you’re 
a traitor’. And vice versa… Critics who accuse the authorities of building a fake export version of 
Russia in Sochi hurt the feelings of Olympic fans: "By spitting on Putin, the opposition and the 
Western media spit on us, at our Olympics"20. 
Nemtsov’s contestation of the hegemonic discourse only confirmed the original political 
meanings of the Games as a laboratory for Russian identity-making. Ultimately, it is the 
sovereign to whom Nemtsov had to address his protest against legalized exceptions and 
inclusions in the form of prohibition, rejections, bans and denial of rights, thus engaging with an 
inclusive / exclusive type of relations with the Kremlin21.  
 
Exceptions versus Norms 
In this section we turn to what constitutes, in our opinion, the core of Nemtsov's 
contestation of a second pillar of Putin's model of sovereign power - the rule by exceptions. The 
political meaning of exception is deeply grounded in the Schmittian understanding of sovereignty 
as based on political will and the ability to take decisions beyond institutional constraints and 
commitments. In other words, “the sovereign is by definition endowed with a will so strong that 
is capable of abolishing any existing system of norms”22. In political theory this triggered a vivid 
                                                        
18 Jodi Dean. Why Zizek for Political Theory? International Journal of Zizek Studies, vol. 1, N 1, p. 22 
(18-32) 
19 http://sochi.fbk.info/en/ 
20  Anna Nemtsova. Patriotism and the Olympics, Foreign Policy, February 17, 2014, available at 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2014/02/17/patriotism-and-the-olympics/ 
21 Slawomir Oliwniak. Foucault and Agamben: Law as Inclusive / Exclusive Discourse, Studies in Logics, 
Grammar and Rhetoric, N 26 (39), 2011, p. 52 (49-53) 
22  Camil Ungureanu. Derrida on Free Decision: Between Habermas’ Discursivism and Schmitt’s 
Decisionism, The Journal of Political Philosophy, vol. 16, N 3, 2008, p. 322 (292-325). 
discussion focused on the Schmittian paradoxical assertion “that to produce law it need not be 
based on law”23. 
Putin’s Olympic project from the outset was conceptually ambiguous, since it embraced 
two interrelated perspectives. First, this mega-event, according to Kremlin’s design, was 
supposed to give a powerful boost to Russian national identity, a collective We-feeling infused 
with positive narration of the country's "normalcy" and its comeback to a group of world leaders. 
Second, the Olympic project was meant to legitimize what might be called, along the lines of 
Carl Schmitt, the state of sovereign exception through extraordinary measures that are not 
necessarily harmonious with the law. In fact, Putin’s normalization could only be achieved by 
means of the application of extraordinary – and extra-legal – instruments, which constituted the 
major political issue Nemtsov tried to unveil by questioning the sovereign's "capacity to 
distinguish between the legal and the illegal, the normal and the exceptional"24, with declarations 
of exceptions quickly turning into a normal condition. 
In fact, as an opposition leader, Nemtsov had to face “the state of exception” as a set of 
policy tool the Kremlin regularly applied to constrain the dissent. As a candidate who ran for the 
post of the Sochi mayor in 2009, Nemtsov and his team were targets of a policy of sovereign 
exceptions, with courts directly fulfilling Kremlin's orders instead of protecting equal rights for 
all candidates, and media outlets refusing to publish political commercials of the oppositional 
candidate. The whole administrative apparatus, in Nemtsov's later words, was mobilized to 
prevent him from winning the election where he nevertheless finished second with 13,6% of 
votes, which was one of the best results achieved by the opposition on municipal level during all 
years of Putin’s presidency.  
After the 2009 mayoral election, Nemtsov became even more critical of the Olympic 
project. He started more consistently claiming that its implementation on the basis of multiple 
exceptions is detrimental for the country. This is how Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov 
lambasted Putin’s policy of sovereign exceptionalism: 
 
“The federal law on hosting the Olympiad de-facto detaches Sochi from the Russian 
Constitution for a decade. It declares redundant public hearings and promulgation of 
conclusions of environmental expertise… In connection to the Games the legislation is 
being changes in order to facilitate the enforced withholding of land and make impossible 
to contest it in the court. The most precious territories of natural reserves are stripped of 
their protection by the state. Thus, in 2006 the functional zoning of the Sochi national park 
was hastily altered to allow the authorities to start constructing Olympic objects in the areas 
under protection… In 2003 by a decree of the Russian government many reserve lands lost 
their status and since that time could be leased for building tourist and sports facilities…”25                                                          
23 Antonio Cerella. Religion and political form: Carl Schmitt’s genealogy of politics as critique of Juergen 
Habermas’s post-secular discourse, Review of International Studies, N 38, 2012, p. 982 (975-994) 
24 R.B.J.Walker. After the Globe, Before the World. London and New York: Routledge, 2010. P. 35. 
25 Boris Nemtsov and Vladimir Milov. Op.cit., P. 26 
 The message was clear: with the rampant corruption Russia is way below international 
normative standards, and the Games therefore can't "normalize" Russia. Nemtsov also argued that 
it was the direct personification of the Sochi project with Putin that predetermined the blatant 
passivity of the Accounting Chamber that refused to disclose the extant information on profligacy 
and mismanagement in construction works and city infrastructure development during the lead-
up to the Games. 
The state has breached its own economic norms as well. This is how Boris Nemtsov and 
Leonid Martyniuk depicted this: 
 
“The rule operating with regard to private investments has been that 70% of 
the investments are covered by loans from the Vneshekonombank (a state 
corporation!) and 30% by private contributions. However, by the end of 2012, 
the government admitted that practically all the Olympic construction works … 
were running at a loss and would never pay for themselves. As 
Vneshekonombank cautiously put it, “The investors began to view more 
critically the market risks for realization of the projects. The question of return 
on investment arose.” And they increased the bank loans to 90%”26. 
  
The co-authors also pointed to the fact that in spite of Russia’s earlier promises to the 
International Olympic Committee (IOC) during the bidding process, there was no parliamentary 
oversight of the financial management of the Games. Most of the Olympic orders were obtained 
without competitive tenders by brothers Rotenberg and other members of Putin's inner circle. In 
environmental protection, he claimed, international norms were disregarded. Another element of 
the Olympic exceptionalism raised by Nemtsov is the massive use of migrant workforce - about 
16,000 of them were semi-legally employed in Sochi, which created a zone of indistinction 
between legality and its opposite. 
Nemtsov was also critical of enhanced security measures practiced by the organizers of 
the Games. He particularly mentioned a document known as "fan's passport" that all visitors in 
the Olympic stadia had to obtain from security services in addition to regular tickets 27 . In 
Nemtsov’s view, this is an example of unjustified restrictions that encroached upon citizens’ 
rights and ultimately legalized “the state of exception” not as a temporary deviation from normal 
everyday rules, but rather as a model of extra-legal governance with a huge potential of self-
dissemination in many other spheres and situations. As a political commentator Sergey 
Medvedev put it, the Sochi project, sanctified as an act of sovereignty and detached from law,                                                         
26 Boris Nemtsov and Leonid Martyniuk. Winter Olympics in the Sub-Tropics: Corruption and Abuse in 
Sochi. Investigative report, December 6, 2013, p. 6, available at http://www.interpretermag.com/winter-
olympics-in-the-sub-tropics-corruption-and-abuse-in-sochi/ 
27 Boris Nemtsov and Leonid Martyniuk. Op. cit. P. 26 
morals and budgetary regulations, constitutes in Russia a new financial, legal and societal 
anomaly to be reproduced further on28. 
 
Globalization and Autocracy 
Yet Nemtsov not only campaigned against two pillars of Putin's sovereignty - its ability to 
define rules of belonging and rules of exception, but also unveiled the binary structure of the 
hegemonic discourse: it is co-produced by the Kremlin and the IOC. It is the latter that boosts 
sovereignty with exceptional arrangements at its core, and thus bears its share of responsibility 
for consolidation of authoritarian and corrupt practices within Russia 
Both IOC and Putin's regime present themselves as staying beyond politics, yet 
nevertheless in practice engage in politics in many different ways29, basically through defining 
rules of inclusion and exclusion, as well as the content of key messages translated through 
Olympics. In this light, one of the strongest Nemtsov's statements was a direct accusation of IOC 
in corrupt liaisons with Moscow 30 , which unveiled global sports institutions’ penchant for 
organizing mega-events in non-democratic countries - a tendency that obviously stretches far 
beyond Russia. Nemtsov’s invectives were consonant with harsh international criticism of the 
IOC for lack of transparency and corruptive scandals31, which can be matched only by the 
evidences of corruption within FIFA. 
Nemtsov pointed to one of the most controversial – and definitely pivotal – elements of 
the Kremlin Olympic project – its full legitimation by the IOC, in spite of the highly problematic 
practices of human rights violations, environmental deterioration, and corruption. According to 
IOC regulations, 'no kind of demonstration or political, religious or racial propaganda is 
permitted in the Olympic areas'32, which lays ground for suppressing actions of civic activism 
and disagreement of any sort. In all cases of this kind the IOC took the side of the Russian 
government.  Asked about the case of imprisonment of an environmental activist Evgeniy 
Vitishko in Sochi, an IOC spokesman, Mark Adams, stated that he was guilty of vandalising a 
house and said the IOC is satisfied with assurances given by Russian authorities: "We received 
                                                        
28 Sergey Medvedev. Osada Sochi: kak Olimpiada prevraschaetsa v chrezvychainoe polozhenie, Forbes, 
18 September 2013, available at http://m.forbes.ru/article.php?id=244779 
29 M. Patrick Cottrell. Not just the Games? Power, protest and politics at the Olympics, European Journal 
of International Relations, N 17 (4), 2010, p. 744 (729-753). 
30 Boris Nemtsov. My platim ne tol’ko za Olimpiadu, no i za dvorets Yakunina. Radio Free Europe, 3 
June 2013, available at http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/25005247.html 
31 Jules Boykoff. A Bid for a Better Olympics, The New York Times, 13 August 2014, available at 
http://mobile.nytimes.com/2014/08/14/opinion/a-chance-to-reform-the-olympic-
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clarification from Sochi that this is, and we think it remains, a non-Olympic case"33. In the 
meantime, the IOC has warned the ‘Pussy Riot’ group not to come to the Olympic park for any 
political demonstration34. This obvious similarity between the policies of the Kremlin and the 
IOC strengthen Nemtsov’s argument of a structural liaison between global sports institutions and 
local practices of autocratic rule. 
 The importance of highlighting the shadow connections between authoritarian 
governments and global sport institutions extend far beyond the case of Sochi, and can be 
projected to the forthcoming FIFA 2018 World Cup. There were multiple accusations in the 
international media of corruptive linkages between FIFA officials, on the one hand, and the 
Russian government and its business structures - such as "Gazprom" - on the other. In particular, 
the documentary film shot by the Deutsche Welle on May 2015 and titled the ‘Sold Football’ (dir. 
by Robert Kempe and Jochen Leufgens) makes many of these facts public35. 
Against this backdrop, FIFA, the organizer of the World Football Cup in Russia in 2018, 
plays the same role in stabilizing the hegemonic regime in Russia, as IOC did. Thus, the then 
president of FIFA Sepp Blatter, responding to the appeals of US Senators to strip Russia of the 
FIFA tournament as a reaction to Kremlin’s policy in Ukraine, suggested that his opponents 
could “stay home”36.  
 Nemtsov's invectives against indulgent and gratifying policy of the IOC towards multiple 
irregularities and direct legal offenses during the implementation of the Sochi project can be 
helpful for understanding the scandal erupted around FIFA in May 2015. Nemtsov was one of 
those who predicted that the 2018 World Football Cup could be harmful for the integrity of 
Russia that, like Greece, might face deplorable repercussions of corrupt economy37. Commenting 
on the probability of revoking the FIFA decision to host the World Cup in Russia, Nemtsov 
claimed that it is the Kremlin's policy towards Ukraine that can make this option feasible, but in 
the meantime this can help the country save huge amount of money38. Months after Nemtsov’s 
murder it was exactly this argument – Russia’s involvement in the military insurgency in eastern                                                         
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Ukraine and the Western economic sanctions – that was discussed as possible reasons to move 
the FIFA Cup to a different country. 
 
Hard and Soft Powers: the Sochi - Crimea nexus 
 Another momentous element of Kremlin's hegemonic policies is the annexation of 
Crimea, an act of external projection of sovereignty. In March 2014 it became another - of a 
drastically different kind, but paradoxically sharing with the Olympics its function of revealing 
the “fifth column” and “national traitors” - mega-project masterminded by the Kremlin. It played 
a role of litmus test for Kremlin’s rules of belonging and henceforth the official version of 
patriotism implying the right of the sovereign to exceptionalize relations with some neighbors 
and politically treat them differently to other countries.  
 What was at stake in both cases (in Sochi and Crimea) is the making of collective identity, 
and the construction of bonds constitutive for relations of belonging to a “collective We”. By 
establishing and imposing its “hierarchy of communal references” 39 , the state performed a 
hegemonic function, yet in the meantime unleashed counter-hegemonic discourses. In this section 
we dwell upon Nemtsov’s disavowal of the widely spread reading of the Sochi Games as a 
heyday of Russian soft power, which – as it might stem from what he said – was never a top 
priority goal for Putin. 
“Images we’ll see of the majestic Caucasus Mountains surrounding Sochi during the 
Olympics could help to erase some of the painful memories of the recent wars in the Caucasus”40, 
a political commentator wrote only a month before the Games. The rosy expectations did not 
however come true – by annexing Crimea in the immediate aftermath of the closing ceremony in 
Sochi, Russia only reactualized the “painful memories” and extended them to the whole post-
Soviet region. It would be fair to posit that “Russia’s response to the Ukrainian crisis and the 
Olympic Games in Sochi are essentially rooted in the same impetus: Putin’s geopolitical 
ambitions”41. 
 If the Sochi project legitimized corruption and suppressed civil activism, the annexation 
of Crimea that immediately followed the Olympics in March 2014 included another key element 
in the loyalty matrix: legitimation of land grabs and forceful border changes. Boris Nemtsov 
straightforwardly claimed that the annexation of Crimea was planned during the Olympic Games, 
which makes it the first case of land appropriation designed during a global mega-event. This 
questions the widely spread characterization of the Sochi project as an indication of Russia's 
principled preference for soft power tools, as opposed to military instrument of controlling 
foreign territories. This is an important argument for deconstructing the popular interpretation of                                                         
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the Sochi Olympic as a zenith of Russia's soft power that was abruptly reversed by the Russia's 
policy in Ukraine after the EuroMaidan revolution. Nemtsov’s reasoning is fully consistent with 
those commentators in the West who deem that “the Sochi Olympics proved a calculated cover 
for Vladimir Putin’s plans to invade Ukraine”42.  
 The economic part of the annexation of Crimea pointed to another similarity with the 
Sochi project: Nemtsov expected Russian investments in Crimea to be as costly as another 
Olympics for the Russian budget 43 .  Alexei Kudrin confirmed this by estimating that the 
annexation of Crimea will cost Russia from 150 to 200 billion USD, which includes capital flee 
and loses caused by economic sanctions44. Nemtsov’s prediction that the funds invested into the 
Olympics won't bring pay-off effects was fully corroborated by the developments after the 
Olympics. In particular, the Sochi – Crimea nexus was indirectly substantiated by the huge losses 
that VEB Bank incurred in 2014 due to its funding of the Sochi project and credit risks in 
Ukraine45. 
Therefore, Nemtsov was one of those public figures who interpreted the annexation of 
Crimea as another link in the chain of Kremlin's unlawful policies with strong security 
repercussions. It is quite illustrative that the vocabulary of the Nemtsov – Milov report was 
replete with securitization language – they refer to “engineering and transportation collapse”, 
“chronic energy deficit”, “irreparable blow to environment”, “destruction of the urban milieu in 
Sochi”, “threats of a military conflict” in the near-by South Caucasus, and “risks of growing 
inter-ethnic tensions” (allegedly due to the probable inflow of migrants)46.   
Exceptionality is what makes Sochi and Crimea comparable to each other: Nemtsov 
harshly lambasted Putin for signing a decree allowing public servants from Crimea to keep doing 
business due to "specific situation"47 on the ground, which contravenes Russian legislation. For 
integrating Crimea into Russia the State Duma passed 21 legal acts in which special measures 
were in one way or another stipulated, which made experts claim that Crimea might turn in 
“another Chechnya”, a territory where Russian legislation either is invalid or applies with 
numerous amendments48. Yet the two cases are also comparable in terms of their constitutive                                                         
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roles in determining the rules of inclusion and exclusion as mechanisms of identity-making based 
on the loyalty to the regime and the differentiation between its patriotic supporters and "infidel" 
opposition. 
 
Conclusions 
The debate on Nemtsov’s Olympic discourse stretches far beyond the case of Sochi and 
gains even a greater profile and topicality against the backdrop of the deep crisis in Russia’s 
relations with the West as a result of a series of events that followed the Sochi Olympics. Instead 
of celebrating Russian soft power potential and demonstrating the end of economic troubles in 
the country49, as pro-Putin loyalists have expected, only a few months after the closure of the 
Games Russia found itself under severe economic sanctions, with many of its officials on travel 
ban, the growing domestic economic and financial troubles and de-facto involvement in the 
military conflict with Ukraine. Perspectives of ameliorating “the image of wild Russia”50 are 
again delayed to a far distant future.  
Hosting the Sochi Olympics neither prevented Russia from resorting to a hybrid war 
against Ukraine, nor warranted success of future mega-events in this country: the lead-up to the 
FIFA 2018 World Cup takes place under the growing economic isolation, with Western 
businesses gradually leaving Russian markets. The crisis in the entire industry of Russian football 
- from scandalous arrear payments to the national team coach51 to the ousting of the head of the 
Russian Football Union in the immediate aftermath of the international legal investigation against 
FIFA - is another trouble that Russia faces. These developments only support the telos of 
Nemtsov's narrative of contesting the basics of Putin's sovereignty - the rule by exceptions 
sustained by international sports institutions, castigation of disloyalty to the regime, and 
preference to hard power – as opposed to soft power - instruments.   
The rule by exceptions, elevated by Putin at the highest point of his political agenda, 
corrupts the entire system of relations of power in Russia and undermines its governability. The 
same goes for sovereign division of the society into numerically dominant loyal majority and 
statistically much smaller yet politically troublesome groups of dissenters. The crisis of Putinism 
obliterates the PR effects of the Sochi Olympics and ushers in an isolationist Russia enmeshed in 
a self-exhausting conflict with the West.  
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